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EMPLOYER LIABILrrY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER

SECTION 1983: A COMMENT ON STARRETT
V. WADLEY
I.

INMRODUCTION

Sexual harassment' of women in the workplace has been and continues to be a widespread problem. It has been estimated that 49% to
90% of working women in various occupations have suffered from sexual harassment.2 The harassment is not limited to lewd sexual comments and jokes on the job, but includes unsolicited touching and
requests for sexual favors as well.3 In response to this widespread problem, courts have begun to recognize sexual harassment as a cause of
action under both section 19834 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 5 A crucial issue in sexual harassment claims under either section

1983 or Title VII is employer liability for the misconduct of employees.
In particular, when sexual harassment suits are brought pursuant to sec-

tion 1983, one question is whether municipalities can be held liable for
their public officials' misconduct.
The issue of municipal liability under section 1983 was addressed in
Starrettv. Wadley. 6 In Starrett, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
a sexual harassment victim recovery against the municipal employer
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defines sexual harassment as
follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1611 (a) (1985).
Moreover, two types of sexual harassment have been recognized by the courts: quid
pro quo and hostile environment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when terms of
employment are conditioned on the female employee's submission to sexual demands.
Hostile work environment sexual harassment, on the other hand, occurs when the employee's work environment has become hostile or offensive, or the misconduct has unreasonably interfered with the employee's work performance.
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN

C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL

32-47 (1979).

2. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 26-32.

3. See Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989); Starrett v. Wadley,
876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989); Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627
(10th Cir. 1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). An action brought under section 1983 is available only
to the public sector employee. See Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989);
Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (1982). See Meritor Savings Bank v. Venison, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)(holding that an abusive work environment is a form of sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (Meritorwas also the first sexual harassment case considered by the Supreme Court.); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979)(recognizing sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII).
6. 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
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under section 1983. This occurred despite the municipality's knowledge
of the official's misconduct. 7
This comment examines the significance of the Starrett decision. It
further discusses the history of section 1983, and it looks at when a municipality, as employer, can be liable for the actions of its officials. Moreover, this article argues that a more liberal construction of section 1983
should be taken in sexual harassment cases in order to hold municipalities, with notice, liable for the unlawful acts of their officials.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Section 1983 and Municipal Liability

The Supreme Court first interpreted section 19838 in Monell v. Department ofSocial Services.9 Unfortunately, however, Monell has resulted in
much confusion regarding the limits of municipal liability.10 In particular, confusion surrounds a municipality's liability for the tortious acts of
its employees."I
In Monell, a group of female employees brought a class action under
section 1983 against the Department of Social Services, its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its
Mayor. The pregnant employees argued that their federal rights were
violated when they were forced to take unpaid leaves of absence before
12
medical reasons demanded the leaves.
The Court held that local governments, municipal corporations,
and school boards are "persons" under section 1983 and, therefore, are
not immune from suit. 13 The Court further held that local governments, such as municipalities and counties, can be sued directly for
14
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.
7. Id. at 812-19.
8. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
9. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
10. See Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court
Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The
"Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C.L. REv. 883, 883 (1986) (citing Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 482-83 (1982)). See also
Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 6 Sup. CT.
REv. 249, 250 (1987).
11. See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In
each of these cases, the Court was unable to reach a majority opinion.
12. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
13. Id. at 690 (Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that
municipal corporations are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute.).
14. Id. (stating that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 intended
section 1983 to apply to municipalities and other local government units).
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The Monell Court also ruled, however, that a municipality cannot be

held liable for simply employing a tortfeasor. 15 Consequently, a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory. 16 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, instead "articulated
a new standard" of municipal liability under section 1983. Justice Brennan stated:
[A] local government may not be sued for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents; it is when execution of a gov-

ernment's policy or custom-whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may firmly be said to represent

official policy-inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under section 1983.17_

The Court's "policy and custom" rule has, in effect, limited the circumstances in which a municipal employer can be held liable for its em-

ployees' tortious acts.1 8 A municipality is liable for its employee's
actions when a plaintiff "connect[s] the constitutional or federal statutory violation to an 'official policy' or 'governmental custom' of the municipality."' 9 Consequently, municipal liability occurs only when a tort
20
has resulted from action pursuant to municipal policy or custom.

The Monell Court's official policy and custom decision has not only

created confusion for lower courts, but it has also created a heavy burden for the plaintiff.2 1 The confusion surrounding municipal liability
has resulted from the Court's failure to define what constitutes official

policy or custom. 2 2 In Monell, the Court announced broad, vague stan15. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
16. The majority in Monell believed that the statute's legislative history compelled the
conclusion that "Congress did not intend respondeatsuperior to form a basis for section 1983
municipal liability." This decision was based on Congress' rejection of the Sherman
amendment, which was a proposed addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
First, the Court suggested that similar policies-deterrence and insurance-lie
behind both respondeat superior and the Sherman amendment, so that allowing
respondeat superior liability would give rise to the same constitutional objections
that were raised by the opponents of the amendment. Second, the Court reasoned that Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability presented to
it demonstrated congressional opposition to respondeat superior.
Rothfeld, Section 1983 MunicipalLiability and the Doctrineof Respondeat Superior,46 U. Ci. L.
REv. 935, 943-44 (1979) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978)). See also
Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and MunicipalAccountability Under
Section 1983, 62 S. CAL.L. REv. 539, 555-56 (1989); Blum, From Monroe to MonelL Defining
the Scope of Municipal Liability in FederalCourts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 412 n.14 (1978) (stating
that the Court also relied on the language of section 1983 as a basis for rejecting respondeat
superior ...the "subject, or cause to be subjected" language precluded all forms of vicarious liability).
17. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Court's rejection of respondeat superior, and its adoption of a new standard for municipal liability has resulted in much criticism. In particular,
commentators have argued that the legislative history of section 1983 supports the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be liable
on a respondeat superior theory. See generally Brown, supra note 10; Kramer & Sykes, supra
note 10; Rothfeld, supra note 16.
18. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 250.
19. Brooks, Pembaurv. City of Cincinnati: Refining the "Official Policy" Standardfor Section
1983 Municipal Liability, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 323, 328 (1987).
20. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 255.
21. Brooks, supra note 19, at 328.
22. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 250; Brown, supra note 10, at 884.
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dards which have resulted in conflicting applications by many lower
courts. 28 The Court explained that a formal ordinance, regulation, deci-

sion, or policy statement adopted or put in force by officials would constitute official policy.2 4 Moreover, informal practices which are
permanent and Well settled, or persistent and widespread may constitute
custom.

25

Commentators have argued that these vague standards announced
by the Court "[tell] us only that municipal liability must rest on more
than respondeatsuperior, and all of the competing definitions of policy satisfy this requirement.... Indeed, every definition of policy that in any
way limits the ordinary scope of respondeat superior will satisfy Monell by
not imposing liability.. ." simply because the municipality employs the
26
torffeasor.
As a result of the Court's imprecise standards concerning municipal
liability, interpretation of the Monell Court's policy and custom rule was
left to future development. 2 7 The lower courts, therefore, are left with
the task of determining what actions constitute official policy or custom
under section 1983. Consequently, lower courts that take a conservative
view of municipal liability may define policy or custom quite narrowly,
thereby making it difficult for plaintiffs to recover against municipalities.
Moreover, the Monell decision has placed a double burden on plaintiffs. 28 First, the plaintiffs must show that their constitutional or federal
rights were violated by an official action. Then, the plaintiffs must prove
that the act complained of was a result of municipality policy or custom.
The Court's purpose in imposing this heavy burden on the plaintiffs is
29
to prevent municipal liability for an official's private acts.
III.
A.

STARREIT V. WADLEY

Facts

In Starrett v. Wadley, 8 0 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of municipal liability under section 1983. In Starrett, a female employee
brought a sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge suit under section
1983 against her supervisor, Wadley, and his employer, Creek County. 3 1
23. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 254-55 (stating "[b]y limiting municipal liability
to acts pursuant to 'policy' without saying anything more than policy is something different
from respondeat superior, the Supreme Court established a vague category susceptible to
many plausible definitions").
24. Mone!, 436 U.S. at 690.
25. Id. at 691.
26. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 254.
27. Id. at 250.
28. Brooks, supra note 19, at 328.
29. Id.

30. 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 808. Starrett also sought damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1982), and she claimed that her first and fourteenth amendment rights were violated. Id. Moreover, she claimed that Wadley and the county violated
the following provision of Tide VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
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Plaintiff Starrett worked as a deputy assessor for Wadley, who was
elected to his post as County Assessor.3 2 Starrett claimed that during
her one-and-a-half year tenure at-the County Assessor's office, Wadley
continually made sexual advances toward her and toward other female
employees.3 3 Starrett alleged that Wadley pinched her on the buttocks
with his full hand, made obscene gestures towards her, and requested
that she meet him at his house and other locations.3 4 On one occasion,
Starrett claimed that Wadley asked her to go with him to a motel.3 5 After Starrett declined his offers, Wadley retaliated. He suggested to Star36
rett that her job might be terminated for "budgetary" reasons.
Starrett subsequently complained to Wadley, Wadley's attorney and
37
to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners ("Board").
Despite her complaints, the Board did not take prompt remedial action.3 8 The Board did not conduct an investigation, nor did it take any
corrective action against Wadley.3 9 The harassment and threats of termination continued. Thereafter, Starrett contacted her own attorney
who wrote a letter to Wadley stating that his acts of sexual harassment
violated Title-VII. 40 Approximately two months after receiving this let4
ter, Wadley terminated Starrett. '
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of.employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
ongin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a) (1982).
32. Starrett,876 F.2d at 812.
33. Id. At trial, three different women, who previously worked under Wadley, testified
that they had also been sexually harassed by Wadley on the job. The former employees
testified that Wadley repeatedly called them at work asking them to meet him outside of
the office. Transcript of the Proceedings at 503-66. Starrett, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir.
1989) (No. 84-695). In particular, Ola Stroud, who worked under Wadley at the assessor's
office, recalled a harassing phone call from Wadley. Wadley asked Stroud if she missed
being married. Thereafter, Wadley stated, "I can do something about that." Record at
564, Starrett (No. 84-695). In fact, on direct examination at trial, Wadley admitted that a
claim of sexual harassment had previously been made against him by a former employee.
Record at 52, Starrett (No. 84-695).
34. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
35. Id. at 814-15. This proposition occurred when Wadley and Starrett were assessing
a property. On the return trip, the two passed a motel, at which time Wadley suggested
they stay there for the afternoon. Record at 81, Starrett (No. 84-695).
36. 876 F.2d at 812. Starrett testified that Wadley would call her repeatedly saying,
"I'm going to let someone go, I've got to let someone go." Record at 98, Starrett (No. 84695).
37. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
38. The Board of County Commissioners has the authority to begin ouster proceedings against a county official under certain circumstances. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1181

(1988).
39. The Board commenced ouster proceedings against Wadley two years after Starrett complained to its Chairman. In fact, the proceedings began only after Wadley received his third D.U.I.. Moreover, the petition for ouster failed to mention any sexual
harassment complaints brought against Wadley. Telephone interview with Gregory Bledsoe, plaintiff's attorney (Apr. 3, 1990).
40. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
41. On October 3, 1983, Starrett received a phone call from Wadley saying that she
was fired. Starrett testified that Wadley "told me to leave," and he also said that "I don't
like you going to an attorney." Record at 120, Starrett (No. 84-695). Moreover, Starrett
had more seniority in the assessor's office than other employees. Accordingly, she should
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Holding

The Tenth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that Wadley's act of sexually harassing Starrett was a
violation of her right to equal protection. 4 2 The court further affirmed
the lower court's holding that the county was liable for Wadley's act of
firing Starrett. 43 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding,
however, that the county was liable for Wadley's sexual harassment of
44
Starrett.
45
The court used the Monell holding as a basis for its decision.
Judge Ebel, writing for the panel, reasoned that under Monell, a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.4 6 Instead, a municipality is only liable for acts of its officials if
those acts constitute official policy or custom. 4 7 Furthermore, under
Monell, a municipality can only be liable for the acts of an official who has
final policymaking authority with respect to the acts in question. 48 Mere
exercise of discretion by a county official is not sufficient to create mu49
nicipal liability.
Because Wadley had the final authority concerning hiring and firing
of personnel, his acts in this area constituted the official acts of the
county. Wadley's actions of hiring and firing carried official sanction.
The court, however, held that Wadley's private acts and personal urges
did not carry official sanction or authority. According to the court, these
acts did not concern any terms of employment and were, therefore, not
the official acts of the county. 50 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that
the county could be liable for the acts of Wadley if they were part of a
custom or policy within the office. 5 1
In addressing the "custom and policy" issue, the court stated that
Wadley's acts of sexual harassment were sporadic and few. His actions
not have been the first employee fired had there truly been layoffs due to budgetary reasons. Record at 118, Starrett (No. 84-695).
42. Starrett,876 F.2d at 814.
43. Id. at 818 (reasoning "that Wadley's act of firing plaintiff was an act of the County
because Wadley had final authority to set employment policy as to the hiring and firing of
his staff").
44. Starrett's section 1983 claims were tried to a jury and her Title VII claims were
tried to the district court. The jury returned a verdict in Starrett's favor and against defendants Wadley and the county. Thereafter, the county moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") on the issue of municipal liability for the abusive work
environment created by Wadley. The district court denied the motion forJNOV. Id. at
819. Moreover, the district court dismissed Starrett's Title VII claim based on the "personal staff" exemption found in Title VII definition of "employee." Title VII states:
"[t]he term 'employee'... 'shall not include' any person elected to public office.., or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff .... Id. at 821 n.17.
45. Id. at 818-20.
46. Id. at 818.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 820 (stating the sexual harassment did not concern "job title or description,
salary levels, or other conditions that Wadley could establish..
51. Id.
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were directed towards only a few members of his staff.5 2 Furthermore,
the court said that there was no evidence that any other officials in the
County Assessor's office sexually harassed the female employees. As a
result, the evidence did not support a view that there was widespread
the
practice of sexual harassment. Consequently, the court held that
53
sexual harassment did not rise to the level of policy or custom.
Moreover, the court noted that Starrett did not attempt to bring her
grievance to the attention of the Board by placing it on the agenda, as
she could have done.M The court suggested that this failure had the
effect of shielding the county from liability for Wadley's acts of sexual
harassment.
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS

Official Action Constituting Custom or Policy

Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's holding, Wadley's acts of sexual
harassment did rise to the level of official policy or official custom. 5 5
Wadley's actions, therefore, violated Starrett's constitutional rights
thereby creating municipal liability. In order to establish that the misconduct rose to a level of policy or custom three requirements must be
satisfied. The plaintiff must: (1) prove that the policymaker chose to
pursue a particular course of action or custom by proof of notorious
practice; (2) attribute the misconduct to the municipality; and (3) prove
that there is a causal connection between the policy or custom and the
constitutional deprivation. 5 6 In Starrett, these three requirements were
satisfied.
First, Wadley, as policymaker, deliberately chose to follow a course
of action in the County Assessor's office. Wadley chose to create an environment of sexual and retaliatory harassment. Four women who
worked under Wadley testified that they had all been sexually harassed
by Wadley. 57 All four claimed, for example, that Wadley repeatedly
called them at work and asked them to meet him in secluded places.
Moreover, there was evidence that two other female employees were
58
sexually harassed by Wadley subsequent to Starrett's termination.
Consequently, not only was sexual harassment a deliberate course of
52.
usually
53.
54.
55.

Id. Moreover, the court noted that Wadley's harassment of the female employees
only occurred while he was intoxicated. Id. at 812.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 812 n.1.
Commentators have criticized the courts for not distinguishing between policy

and custom. See Gerhardt, supra note 16, at 584.
56. Gerhardt, supra note 16, at 583 (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386-88
(4th Cir. 1987) and Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984)).
57. Transcript of the Proceedings at 503-66. Starrett, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989)
(No. 84-695).
58. The plaintiff attempted to introduce this evidence at trial. The trial court, however, did not admit the evidence because the harassment occurred after Starrett was fired.
Record at 553, 572. Starrett,876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989) (No. 84-695). This evidence is
relevant in establishing that sexual harassment rose to a level of custom or policy at the
assessor's office.
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action in the assessor's office, but it was a notorious and pervasive practice as well.
Second, this misconduct is easily attributed to the county. For example, after Starrett complained to Wadley and his attorney, she then
made a complaint to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners. 59 The Board did not conduct an investigation, nor did it take
prompt corrective action against Wadley. 60 Essentially, the county ac61
quiesced in Wadley's sexual demands on Starrett.
Third, the county's policy of acquiescence caused a deprivation of
Starrett's equal protection rights. The county's deliberate indifference
towards Wadley's acts of sexual harassment is considered "supervisory
encouragement" of the sexual harassment. 6 2 Since it is unconstitutional
for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on sex, the
county violated Starrett's constitutional rights. 63 The county's policy of
acquiescence, in effect, amounted to encouragement of sexual harassment. The third element is, therefore, satisfied because there is an "affirmative link" between the policy and the constitutional right
deprivation.
Sexual harassment rising to the level of official policy or custom was
addressed in Bohen v. City of East Chicago.64 In Bohen, a female dispatcher
for a fire department, brought a sexual harassment action pursuant to
section 1983.65 The plaintiff claimed that her immediate supervisor was
59. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.

60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. See Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
Tomkins considered whether the failure to take prompt action after receiving notice of misconduct constitutes acquiescence in the misconduct. Id. at 1046. In Tomkins, a female employee filed an employment discrimination suit under Title VII against her employer and
male supervisor, complaining of sexual harassment. Id. at 1045. In deciding whether the
employer could be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its supervisor, the court
considered whether the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the sexual harassment. Moreover, the court considered whether the employer promptly remedied the
situation after receiving notice. Id. at 1048-49. The court held that:
[a person's equal protection rights are violated] when a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job status
• * on a favorable response to those advances or demands, and the employer
does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such
knowledge.
Id. See also Husband, An Overview of the Law of Semual Harassment, 1983 CoLo. LAw. 1459,
1460.
62. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). A state
official is liable for the acts of his or her subordinates if (1) the subordinate's behavior
results in a constitutional violation and (2) the official's action or inaction was connected to
the behavior in the sense that it could be considered as encouragement, condonation, or
acquiescence. Essentially, to establish a link between the state official and the employee's
misconduct, the plaintiff must prove that the official acquiesced in the behavior "by remaining impassive before complaints of such discriminatory and harassing conduct or by
refusing to acknowledge and investigate a strikingly obvious pattern of sex discrimination
and harassment... or that such discriminatory treatment was part of a policy sanctioned
by them." Id. at 902.
63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
64. 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 1187.
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the "source of most of the abuse." 6 6 Bohen claimed, for example, that
on her first night of work, she took a nap and awoke to find that her
supervisor had his hands pressed against her crotch. She complained to
the appropriate personnel but no remedial action was taken. 6 7 Bohen
stated that this was the first of many sexual harassment incidents and the
68
first of many complaints.
The Seventh Circuit held that the city was liable under section 1983
for ongoing sexual harassment when management officials knew of the
harassment and no corrective action was taken. 69 The court reasoned
that "[e]vidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination . . . is of
course strong evidence supporting a plaintiff's claim that she herself has
been the victim of discrimination." 70 Moreover, the court stated that
sexual harassment is attributable to the employer under section 1983 by
showing the employer failed to protect the plaintiff from the abusive environment. 7 1 Finally, the court stated that "[a]n entity may be liable
even for 'informal actions, if they reflect a general policy, custom, or
pattern of official conduct which even tacitly encourages conduct depriving citizens of their constitutionally protected rights.' "72
B.

Wadley Is the County and His Actions Are the Actions of the County

Alternatively, Wadley's actions as a top official and policymaker are
the actions of the county. Under Monell, for example, the Court held
that a policymaker's actions are considered the actions of the municipality73 because the official is the agent of the municipality. Essentially,
therefore, a municipality is responsible for the misconduct of its top
public officials.
Since Wadley was a public official and top policymaker, the county
is responsible for his actions, including his acts of sexual harassment.74
Wadley qualified as a policymaker because under Oklahoma Statute title
19, section 161, 75 the County Assessor is a county officer. Generally, a
66. Id. at 1182. The plaintiff, however, also stated that other male employees at the
fire department also sexually harassed her. Bohen stated that her supervisor constantly
spoke to her in a lewd way. In particular, he described to her his preferred sexual positions. He also touched her by rubbing his pelvis against her and spreading his legs so that
he touched her when she sat. Moreover, when Bohen used the bathroom, the supervisor
forced her to leave the door open. Id.
67. Id. at 1187.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1189.
70. Id. at 1187.
71. Id. (stating that the "officials knew of the sexually oppressive working conditions
even before Bohen was hired ....
The department, however, considered the abusive
environment to be the female employees' problem").
72. Id. at 1189 (quoting Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 870 (7th Cir. 1983)).
73. Mone/!, 436 U.S. at 694.
74. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)("[A judgment against a public
servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents ..
");
McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1981)("[O]fficial-capacity suits generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.").

75. OK.A. STAT. tit. 19, § 161 (1981) (1) states that "'County Officer' means the
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public officer is considered one whose official "position requires the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power .. ."76 Moreover, essential characteristics of public office are: (1) a portion of the sovereign
power is delegated to the position; (2) the duties and powers are defined; (3) the duties are performed independently without control of superior power other than law; and (4) the position has some permanency
and continuity. 77 In effect, a public official with sovereign authority is a
top policymaker.
Based on these definitions, Wadley, acting in his official capacity,
was a top policymaker. First, Wadley was empowered with independent
authority to perform certain governmental functions. The County Assessor, for example, has the sovereign authority to ascertain the amount
of value of property. 78 Moreover, Wadley had the sovereign authority
to determine and set the quality of atmosphere and environment in the
assessor's office. Second, Wadley's duties and powers were statutorily
defined. For example, Wadley was empowered with the authority to affirm that the value of property coincided with statements made by the
property owners. 79 Third, Wadley had the power to perform his duties
independently. Under Oklahoma law, an Elected County Assessor is the
supreme official in his office. Essentially, only the Board of County
Commissioners had power over Wadley. This power, however, was very
limited. The Board could only commence ouster proceedings against
Wadley in certain circumstances. 8 0 Fourth, Wadley's position had permanency and continuity. As an elected official, Wadley held his office
for four years. 8 1 Consequently, Wadley's position satisfied the requirements of a public officer and top policymaker. Therefore, Wadley's acts
"may fairly be said to represent official [county] policy ....,,82
In Brandon v. Holt,88 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of a
public official's actions imposing "liability on the entity that he represented ....-84 In Brandon, the plaintiff brought suit pursuant to section
1983 against a Memphis police officer, the Director of the Memphis Poo

county clerk, county commissioner, county assessor, county superintendent of schools
76. Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 909 (10th Cir. 1984)(quoting Town of Arlington v. Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976)).
77. Dutrlinger, 727 F.2d at 890 (quoting State v. Taylor, 260 Iowa 634, 639, 144
N.W.2d 289, 292 (1966)). See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1107 (5th ed. 1979) ("Essential characteristics of public office are (1) authority conferred by law, (2) fixed tenure of
office, and (3) power to exercise some portion of sovereign functions of government; key
element of such test is that the officer is carrying out sovereign function.").
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2435 (1988).
79. Id
80. The Board could only initiate ouster proceedings if it found, for example, that
Wadley: (1) habitually or wilfully neglected his duties; (2) exercised gross partiality; (3)
used oppression; (4) used corruption; (5) practiced extortion; and (6) practiced willful
maladministration. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1181 (1988).
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 131 (B) (1988).
82. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
83. 469 U.S. 464 (1985).
84. Id. at 471.
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lice Department, and the city.85 The plaintiff claimed that the director
acted improperly in his official capacity. According to the plaintiff, the
director "should have known [that an officer in the department had]
dangerous propensities [which] created a threat to the rights and safety
of citizens." 8 6 The district court attributed this lack of knowledge to
87
policies in effect at the department.
In Brandon, the Court "equated" the director's actions, in his official
capacity, with the actions of the city. 88 The Court quoted Monell in saying "[o]fficial capacity suits generally represent an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent ... ."89 Consequently, the Court
reversed and remanded stating that the city was not entitled to a "shield
of qualified immunity from liability under section 1983."96
Moreover, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,9 1 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a single action taken by a policymaker can
result in municipal liability. In Pembaur, the Supreme Court stated that a
single incident of unconstitutional activity may constitute official policy
if the activity is consistent with formal rules or established practices of
the municipality, or if the activity is directed by officials responsible for
92
formulating government policy.
The Court in Pembaur specified three circumstances in which a sin9
gle action or decision creates municipal liability under section 1983. 3
First, a decision made by a properly constituted governing body'such as
a city council or legislature would qualify. 9 4 Second, the Court stated
that a single decision made by a municipal official when that decision is
85. Id. at 464-65. Originally, the city was not named as a dfendant in the action
because the complaint was filed before Monell was decided. Consequently, at the time of
filing, municipalities were not considered "persons" under section 1983. Thus, cities were
immune from suit for the tortious acts of their officials. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, after Monell was decided. Consequently, the Court allowed the plaintiff to
amend the pleadings. The plaintiff amended the pleading and claimed a right to recover
against the city. Id. at 469.
86. Id. at 467.
87. Id. at 467 n.6 (stating that "when complaints were filed by citizens, little disciplinary action was apparently taken.... Instead, a standard form letter.., was mailed to each
complainant, assuring the person that appropriate action had been taken..
88. Id. at 472.
89. Id. at 469-70 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
90. Id. at 473. See also McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). In McKay,
the plaintiff brought suit under section 1983 against Routt County, the Colorado Sheriff's
Office, the sheriff and a deputy sheriff, the Ruidoso, New. Mexico Police Department, and a
police officer. Id. at 1369. The plaintiff alleged his due process rights were violated when
he was wrongfully arrested. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that the Sheriff, as an official
officer, was responsible for the policies and procedures of Routt County. Id. at 1375.
Consequently, the county is liable under Monell for implementing "an unconstitutional act
if [the Sheriff] knowingly was involved in an intentional constitutional deprivation." Id. See
also Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980)(holding the county liable for
a county judge's misconduct).
91. 475 U.S. 469 (1986). The plurality in Pembauragreed that one decision made by a
policymaker could constitute policy. Id. at 484. There were, however, five different opinions as to what legal standard should be applied in determining which official's actions
may be considered policy. Gerhardt, supra note 16, at 568.
92. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484.
93. Brooks, supra note 19, at 330.
94. Pemnbaur, 475 U.S. at 480.
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made according to formal rules or understandings constitutes official
policy. 9 5 Third, the Pembaur plurality held that municipal liability can
occur when a single decision is made by the government's authorized
decisionmakers or by those who generally establish policy. 9 6 Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality stated:
[i]f the decision to adopt that particular course of action is
properly made by that government's authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an act of official government
"policy" .... [W]here action is directed by those who establish
governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible
whether that
action is to be taken only once or to be taken
97
repeatedly.
The Court consequently expanded municipal liability under section
1983.98 One unconstitutional act by an official with decisionmaking authority constitutes official policy.
Using the Pembaurplurality's rationale, therefore, Wadley's actions
were actions of the county, thereby creating municipal liability for Wadley's misconduct. As County Assessor, Wadley was an authorized decisionmaker who established policy for the office. Essentially, a single
unconstitutional act taken by Wadley, in his official capacity, represented
official government policy. Thus, Wadley's sexual harassment of Starrett amounted to government policy, and therefore, the county is responsible for this misconduct.
C. Failure to Use Proper Grievance Procedure Does Not Insulate the Employer
from Liability
In Starrett, the court noted that even though the plaintiff personally
complained to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners
about the sexual harassment, she did not bring her complaint to the
Board's attention by placing it on the agenda, as she could have done. 9 9
In essence, the court implied that Starrett's failure to use the proper
grievance procedure insulated the county from liability.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 00 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a plaintiff's failure to utilize a complaint procedure
precludes or shields an employer from liability.10 1 In Meritor, a female
bank employee brought a sexual harassment suit against her supervisor
and his employer, the bank.' 0 2 The plaintiff claimed that her supervisor
asked her to have sexual relations with him since she "owed him" for his
95. Id. at 480-81.
96. Id. at 480. See generally, Griffin, Civil Rights-MunicipalLiability Extended to Include Single Acts of Official Decsionmakers, 21 SuffoLK U.L. REv. 237 (1987); Krulewitch, Civil RightsUnder the Civil Rights Act, MunicipalLiability May Be Imposed Under Appropriate Circumstances, 36
DRAKm L. REV. 465 (1987).
97. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
98. Id.
99. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812 n.1 (1989).
100. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
101. Id. at 71.
102. Id. at 59.

1990]

STARRETT V. WADLEY

help in getting the job. She initially declined but eventually yielded to
his demands out of fear that continual refusal would result in termination.1 03 Thereafter, he made continual sexual demands on her both
during and after business hours. ° 4 The plaintiff claimed that she never
reported this harassment to any supervisor and never attempted to use
the complaint procedure because she was afraid of her supervisor. 0 5
In Meritor, the Supreme Court rejected automatic immunity for the
employer because the plaintiff failed to use an existing grievance procedure. 10 6 The Court stated that "the absence of notice.., does not nec0 7
essarily insulate [an] employer."'
In making its decision, the Court relied extensively on the Solicitor
General's Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").'0 8 The Court drew upon the EEOC's belief that:
[i]f the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to
resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not
take advantage of that procedure, the employer should be
shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the sexually
hostile environment .... In all other cases, the employer will
be liable if he has actual knowledge of the harassment or if,
considering all the facts of the case, the victim in question had
no reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint
known to appropriate management officials. 10 9
Consequently, using the rationale in Meritor, Starrett's claim against
the county does not fail because she did not place her grievance on the
Board's agenda. Rather, Starrett's complaint to the Chairman of the
Board of County Commissioners was enough, standing alone, to notify
the appropriate officials.

Moreover, neither the county nor the County Assessor's office had
an expressed policy against sexual harassment. 10 In addition, a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims had not
been implemented by the county. As a result, the county should not
have been shielded from liability for Wadley's acts of sexual harassment.
103. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 760 F.2d 1330
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc), aft'd, 477 U.S. 59 (1986).
104. Mer/tor, 477 U.S. at 60 (stating that the supervisor fondled the plaintiff in front of
other employees, followed her into the women's rest room, exposed himself to her, and
forcibly raped her on several occasions).
105. Id. at 61.
106. Id. at 72-73. See also Equal Employment Opportunty Commission v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the existence of a grievance procedure and
policy against sex discrimination, coupled with employees' failure to invoke procedure, did
not insulate employer from liability for sexually harassing conduct).
107. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
108. Note, Employer Liability Under Title VIIfor Sexual HarassmentAfter Meritor.Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1266-71 (1987) (noting that the EEOC entered as amicus cIriat).

109. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 71.
110. Telephone interview with Gregory Bledsoe, plaintiff's attorney (Apr. 3 1990).
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D. Policy Dictates Employer Sanctioning Employer or ConferringLiability
Sexual harassment on the job pervades all areas of business. The
victims not only suffer humiliation and embarrassment, but they suffer
fear as well. Many victims realize that the loss of their job is a very real
consequence they might face for making a complaint about the harassment. Consequently, many female employees simply remain silent.
One way to remedy this problem, however, is to sanction and hold employers liable for not establishing policies aimed at preventing sexual
harassment in the work place.
In Starrett, for example, had the county adopted a firm policy against
sexual harassment and had the County Commissioner's office accepted
this policy, Starrett would not have had to endure one-and-a-half years
of suffering. Instead, however, it appears as though the Board and the
county did not consider sexual harassment a problem in today's society.
The county's brief on appeal demonstrates its permissive attitude toward sexual harassment. The county wrote:
It is somewhat astonishing that in the most materialistic, if
not hedonistic, culture ever created by man's ingenuity that
rules of sexual conduct as stringent as any imagined by the Puritan fathers have suddenly been erected in the workplace. A
pair of novelty glasses which picture a nude female when properly filled with water become relevant in determining whether a
judgment should be rendered for sexual harassment. This in a
culture whose highest court struggled with the difficulty of even
defining obscenity and where billion dollar businesses (entertainment, advertising, publishing) are soundly founded
upon female nudity and salaciousness. But if an improper remark is passed in the office or if the boss gets drunk and makes
a pass at a secretary, whether serious or not, it's ajury question
and a feast of lawyer's fees. No wonder our courts complain of
being overworked.
How much is it worth to a plaintiff if her boss flips her the
finger? How much if she "thinks" he made an obscene gesture? How much for saying lets spend the afternoon at the
Blue Top Motel in circumstances in which it would be almost
impossible to take him seriously? How much per pinch on the
rear? How much for spending an afternoon at the Cue Spot in
Mannford drinking a few beers when he probably should have
been working? Is this the sort of raw meat that should be
thrown to a jury with no more education and instruction than
to do right? And what more is an instruction that "sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature."
What the jury is really invited to do under such circumstances is to conduct a popularity poll. Do they approve or disapprove of the particular public official on trial. And of course,
counsel are aware of this. It becomes a question of can we
throw this thing on the wall and will it stick? Can we get
enough of the opinions and rumors of his enemies, political op-
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ponents and dissatisfied employees through the hedge of the
rules of evidence to make him look bad. If we can, we may walk
away with a verdict."'
In Arnold v. City of Seminole, 1 12 the Oklahoma district court discussed
a group of city officials' complete lack of understanding and awareness
of sexual harassment. The district court stated that:
[Many of the city officials] did not appear to recognize or admit
that harassment was more than good fun or regular and expected behavior .... The [city officials] were clearly unwilling
to confront the problem and the problem maker in particular
....It would have been relatively simple to put an end to the
harassment of the plaintiff had anyone in authority chosen to
do so." 13
As a result, the court ordered the city to "raise affirmatively the subject
of sexual harassment with all employees and to inform all employees
that sexual harassment...,,114 violates a person's constitutional rights.
Moreover, the court required the city to develop a plan whereby employees who are subject to sexual harassment may complain immediately
and confidentially. The court stated that "[a]n important part of a preventative plan is an effective procedure for investigating, hearing, adjudicating and remedying complaints of sexual harassment and
discrimination."115
V.

CONCLUSION

Exploiting and taking advantage of female employees has extreme
negative consequences. The female employees experience both physical
and psychological effects. The victims suffer from stress, feelings of
powerlessness, fear, anger, and diminished ambition. One way to combat this sex discrimination is to take a more liberal stance towards employer liability, especially towards employers who have notice of their
employee's misconduct. This would, in effect, force employers to take
precautions against sexual harassment in the workplace. In particular, a
policy against sexual harassment will suggest to employees that such
conduct in the workplace will not be tolerated.
Kristin D. Sanko
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